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Evidence synthesis in international development: A critique of 
systematic reviews and a pragmatist alternative 
Systematic reviews are an instrument of Evidence-Based Policy designed to 
produce comprehensive, unbiased, transparent and clear assessments of 
interventions’ effectiveness. From their origins in medical fields, systematic 
reviews have recently been promoted as offering important advances in a range 
of applied social science fields, including international development. Drawing on 
a case study of a systematic review of the effectiveness of community 
mobilisation as an intervention to tackle HIV/AIDS, this article problematizes the 
use of systematic reviews to summarise complex and context-specific bodies of 
evidence. Social development interventions, such as ‘community mobilisation’ 
often take different forms in different interventions; are made successful by their 
situation in particular contexts, rather than being successful or unsuccessful 
universally; and have a rhetorical value that leads to the over-application of 
positively valued terms (e.g. ‘community mobilisation’), invalidating the key-
word search process of a systematic review. The article suggests that the policy 
interest in definitive summary statements of ‘the evidence’ is at odds with 
academic assessments that evidence takes multiple, contradictory and complex 
forms, and with practitioner experience of the variability of practice in context. A 
pragmatist philosophy of evidence is explored as an alternative. Taking this 
approach implies expanding the definition of forms of research considered to be 
‘useful evidence’ for evidence-based policy-making; decentralising decisions 
about ‘what works’ to allow for the use of local practical wisdom; and 
prioritising the establishment of good processes for the critical use of evidence, 
rather than producing context-insensitive summaries of ‘the evidence’.     
Keywords: evidence-based policy; systematic review; community mobilisation; 
international development; pragmatism 
Introduction 
Emerging in the mid-1980s, the EBP movement has gained supporters, become a 
commonplace in many disciplines, and become a gatekeeper for the allocation of 
intervention funding (Lambert 2006; Cartwright and Hardie 2012). The argument, 
initially developed in the context of Evidence-Based Medicine, was that much of 
doctors’ practice was based on tradition or preference rather than upon rigorous science 
(Lambert 2006). Hence, objective evidence was called for, to challenge the authority of 
doctors’ idiosyncratic preferences, to make them more accountable, and ultimately to 
improve patient care by reference to the most up-to-date and authoritative evidence. A 
parallel argument emerged, with the move to EBP more generally, that the constraints 
of evidence would prevent policies from being based on ideological, moralistic, or 
party-political preferences, and would establish policies with a more rational basis and 
universal relevance. The important claims were claims about a science which is 
empirical (i.e. based in examination of the world rather than hearsay or ideology), and 
which is disinterested (i.e. independent of political influence). While such ambitions for 
empiricism and independence are widely understood as basic foundations of science, 
including social science, this paper takes issue with the model of disinterested science 
that EBP implies. In particular, it problematises the aspiration to abstract a ‘treatment’ 
or ‘intervention’ from its particular context in order to make general claims about 
whether the treatment should be considered to have succeeded or to have failed as an 
intervention worthy of repeating and funding.  
Evidence Based Policy 
Emerging in the mid-1980s, the EBP movement has gained supporters, become a 
commonplace in many disciplines, and become a gatekeeper for the allocation of 
intervention funding (Lambert 2006; Cartwright and Hardie 2012). The argument, 
initially developed in the context of Evidence-Based Medicine, was that much of 
doctors’ practice was based on tradition or preference rather than upon rigorous science 
(Lambert 2006). Hence, objective evidence was called for, to challenge the authority of 
doctors’ idiosyncratic preferences, to make them more accountable, and ultimately to 
improve patient care by reference to the most up-to-date and authoritative evidence. A 
parallel argument emerged, with the move to EBP more generally, that the constraints 
of evidence would prevent policies from being based on ideological, moralistic, or 
party-political preferences, and would establish policies with a more rational basis and 
universal relevance. The important claims were claims about a science which is 
empirical (i.e. based in examination of the world rather than hearsay or ideology), and 
which is disinterested (i.e. independent of political influence). While such ambitions for 
empiricism and independence are widely understood as basic foundations of science, 
including social science, this paper takes issue with the model of disinterested science 
that EBP implies. In particular, it problematises the aspiration to abstract a ‘treatment’ 
or ‘intervention’ from its particular context in order to make general claims about 
whether the treatment should be considered to have succeeded or to have failed as an 
intervention worthy of repeating and funding. 
One of the social purposes of EBP is to enable accountable decisions regarding 
which of a number of competing interventions should be funded (Cornish and Gillespie 
2009). Should limited HIV/AIDS funds, for instance, be devoted to peer education 
interventions to encourage condom use, or to gender transformative self-help groups to 
foster women’s control over their relationships, or to income generation efforts to foster 
women’s economic security, or to male circumcision to reduce HIV transmission? To 
make a vast and diverse literature legible, in the EBP paradigm, technologies of 
‘evidence grading’ and ‘evidence synthesis’ are employed. ‘Evidence grading’ systems, 
and ‘hierarchies of evidence’ offer definitions of evidence quality and associated 
gradings, to allow for transparent assessments of the quality of evidence, the magnitude 
of benefit, and the strength of recommendations for policy or practice(e.g., GRADE 
Working Group 2004). Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) typically sit at the top of 
such systems, followed by uncontrolled studies, cohort studies, descriptive and case 
studies (Evans 2003; Harris et al. 2001). Experimental, quantitative evidence is 
prioritised, and context-specific case studies or qualitative methods are devalued. 
Evidence grading systems are usually applied to individual research articles. To bring 
those articles together, and make a statement about ‘the evidence’ as a whole, evidence 
synthesis techniques – predominantly systematic reviews – are used (Mulrow 1994). 
Various critiques of EBP have been made (see Lambert 2006, for an exemplary review). 
This paper takes issue with the summarising ambition of ‘evidence synthesis’ through 
the highly valued ‘systematic review’. 
Systematic reviews 
A systematic review is a literature review designed to reach high levels of 
comprehensiveness and transparency. Waddington et al (2012, 360) characterise a 
systematic review as having ‘a clear protocol for systematically searching defined 
databases over a defined time period, with transparent criteria for the inclusion or 
exclusion of studies, as well as the analysis and reporting of study findings.’ While a 
systematic review could be employed to answer a variety of questions, the most 
common is the effectiveness question: What is the evidence that a particular 
intervention produces particular desired outcomes? (White and Waddington 2012). 
Originally established in medical research, their perceived value as tools of EBP has led 
to increasing enthusiasm for systematic reviews in a range of applied social science 
areas, including international development, and management.  
Proponents of systematic reviews give two main arguments for their use: 
eliminating bias and providing clarity. Compared with cherry-picking studies to fit a 
pre-conceived policy preference, the transparent protocol of a systematic review is 
intended to minimise bias (DFID Research and Evidence Division 2010; Petticrew and 
Roberts 2006). Systematic reviews provide a synthesis of complex bodies of evidence, 
overcoming ‘information overload’ (Petticrew and Roberts 2006; Waddington et al. 
2012). Introducing its own systematic review program, the DFID Research and 
Evidence Division (2010, 2) writes that systematic reviews present ‘a clearer and more 
consistent picture of the body of evidence, […one] that is accessible and easily 
understandable to non‐experts’. 
Few social scientists would disagree that informed, appropriate use of social 
scientific research is good for policy-making, and indeed that listening to systematic 
reviews rather than relying on individual primary studies, ideology, or hearsay is a good 
idea. This paper does not argue against the idea of systematically collating evidence, 
critically appraising it, and bringing it to bear on policy decisions. It does argue, from a 
perspective rooted in ethnographic engagement in the context-specificities of practice, 
and a reflexive awareness of the rhetorical significance of claims about interventions 
and practice, that the impetus to produce an authoritative, clear statement of ‘the 
evidence’ leads to the misuse of systematic reviews to provide false certainty. This 
argument is grounded in practical experience of conducting a systematic review 
(Cornish et al. 2014). 
Case study: Systematic review of evidence on community mobilisation and 
HIV intervention 
With the expectation (in hindsight, a naïve one), that a systematic review of the 
evidence for community mobilisation would provide useful information, or at least 
useful rhetoric, a group of colleagues and I recently undertook a systematic review of 
the evidence for the impact of community mobilisation within the HIV response in low 
and middle income countries (Cornish et al. 2014). ‘Community mobilisation’ is a term 
that refers to efforts to build and capitalise on community strengths, networks, resources 
and agency. In the HIV/AIDS field, community mobilisation activities are funded as 
part of interventions, in the interest of achieving improvements in terms of HIV-related 
outcome measures. The ‘communities’ that are mobilised often have interests in broader 
social change agendas such as tackling discrimination or securing their rights as 
citizens. ‘Community mobilisation’ is conceptualised in different ways, sometimes as 
‘mobilising’ communities in something akin to a social movement, or collective action 
to tackle HIV/AIDS, sometimes in a more instrumental way as ‘mobilising’ community 
resources in the service of HIV/AIDS interventions. The term grew out of the discourse 
of ‘community participation’ popular in the 1990s. While it was originally used to 
signify an approach to community work that had a politicised angle, initiating collective 
action through ‘mobilisation’, it has increasingly been used to refer to any activity that 
involves bringing community members together (Cornish et al., in prep). Our systematic 
review sought to review ‘authentic’ community mobilisation, not ‘tokenistic’ 
community mobilisation, but this task proved harder than it appeared at first sight. The 
review considered impacts on measures of public health interest, including biomedical 
outcomes (e.g. STI prevalence), behavioural outcomes (e.g. reported condom use), and 
micro-social outcomes (e.g. collective efficacy).   
Our searching and screening process identified 20 relevant studies for inclusion 
in the review. Among these studies, some reported interventions conducted with ‘risk 
groups’ (9 interventions with sex workers; 2 with men who have sex with men, 1 with 
heterosexual men who drink alcohol); some with a more ‘general’ population (4 with 
young people; 4 with adults in a geographically-bound community). Our initial 
conceptualisation of the scope of the review was to synthesise the evidence for 
‘community mobilisation’ in general. However, one of the findings to emerge was that 
the evidence was more positive for the ‘at risk groups’ than for the ‘general population’. 
This difference problematized the impetus to review ‘the evidence in general’, if the 
evidence was different for different groups. 
The findings of the review, in common with so many reviews of social 
interventions (Pawson and Tilley 1997; MacLure 2005) were ‘inconclusive’. Even to 
summarise the findings proves difficult. Guidelines for systematic reviewers caution, 
rightly, against ‘vote-counting’ (that is, counting the numbers of studies producing 
positive, inconclusive and negative results) as a way of summarising the evidence, 
given that the different sample sizes, research designs, and measures used mean that the 
findings of studies cannot simply be added together to give a meaningful answer 
(Petticrew and Roberts 2006). Nonetheless, vote-counting can illustrate the variability 
in findings that emerged.  In the studies with sex workers, 3 studies found 
improvements in biomedical outcomes, and 3 found none. Reported condom use tended 
to increase, but within studies, findings were patchy, for instance improving with paying 
partners but not with non-paying partners. In studies with youth and ‘general 
population’ adults, the findings were less positive, but still patchy. On biomedical 
measures, one study reported improvements, 5 found no effects, and 2 found increases 
in STI/HIV. Overall, we described the findings of the review as indicating that, among 
at risk groups (particularly sex workers), the evidence was ‘somewhat consistent, 
indicating a tendency for positive impact’ (Cornish et al. 2014, 1), and that among youth 
and general communities ‘the evidence remains inconclusive’.   
Substantively, then, it proved practically impossible to come to a reasonable and 
simple conclusion about whether ‘community mobilisation’ works or not. We 
concluded that this was not because ‘community mobilisation’ has ‘failed’ the EBP test. 
Rather, our conclusion was that understanding of ‘evidence’, as conceptualised under 
the regime of EBP, has failed to do justice to community mobilisation. In reflecting on 
the reason for our ‘inconclusive’ findings, we identified three main problems with ‘the 
evidence’ as it stands. The first concerned operationalization of ‘community 
mobilisation’. Despite the term having been introduced to distinguish it from tokenistic  
forms of ‘community participation’, ‘community mobilisation’ itself had become 
instrumentalised and tokenistic (Trickett 2011).  In many interventions, ‘community 
mobilisation’ was described as a process of ‘consulting’ with ‘the community’ or 
‘community leaders’, or ‘sensitising’ the community (e.g. Cowan et al. 2008; Jewkes et 
al. 2006). In such cases, ‘mobilisation’ often meant simply recruiting people to turn up. 
Thus, what is labelled ‘community mobilisation’ in this literature is not necessarily 
good material with which to test the usefulness of mobilising communities in a process 
of collective action. 
The second reason for inconclusive evidence was again a question of the design 
of community mobilisation interventions.  Many of the interventions failed to engage 
with the broader social and political context and power relations that structure health in 
very disadvantaged communities. Contemporary understandings of community 
mobilisation emphasise that communities alone rarely have the power to make the 
social changes needed to sustain healthy behaviour, and hence, that community 
mobilisation needs to be accompanied by efforts to engage powerful stakeholders in the 
pursuit of structural change (Campbell and Cornish 2010; Cornish and Campbell. 2010). 
In programmes involving youth and general communities, there was evidence of limited 
efforts to engage the broader community. Where efforts were made to engage groups 
beyond the target group, this often had the limited aim of enabling the diffusion of 
health-related knowledge rather than engaging them in transformative change. 
Thus, the systematic review process de-contextualises the reports of intervention 
(i.e. the use of the label ‘community mobilisation’ in a published article) from the 
practical activities of the intervention (e.g., the agency accorded to communities versus 
intervention leaders; the relationships among community members; the freedoms of the 
community members to adapt the project goals; the scope of the intervention to address 
structural as well as micro-social levels). The materials with which a systematic review 
operates are published academic articles, that is, texts, not the actualities of practice. 
The relation of those texts to concrete practices is not clear, and the rigorous and 
replicable application of keyword searches does not allow space for critique of how 
community mobilisation was implemented in any particular case. 
Thirdly, reflecting on the very uneven nature of the findings, we suggested that 
the goal of providing an over-arching statement of ‘the evidence’ for community 
mobilisation may itself be misguided (Seckinelgin 2010). We observed a different 
pattern of findings for sex workers and for youth and general communities. In some 
studies, there appeared to be impacts on condom use with some types of partners, but 
not others. The IMAGE study found impressive effects on intimate partner violence 
(widely argued to be a likely contributor to HIV transmission), but no effects on HIV 
incidence. Based on earlier positive results from the Sonagachi Project in Kolkata (Jana 
et al. 2004; Jana and Singh 1995), replications were implemented in Brazil (Lippman et 
al. 2012; Kerrigan et al. 2008) and elsewhere in India (Swendeman et al. 2009; Basu et 
al. 2004) but to less or no positive effect. Furthermore, evaluations of the Avahan 
programme disaggregated aspects of community mobilisation and their impact on a host 
of measures of condom use in a variety of settings, finding some significant 
relationships at a fine-grained level, but little consistency (Saggurti et al. 2013; 
Blanchard et al. 2013; Guha et al. 2012). 
Systematic review: Three problems for context-sensitive processes 
The experiences and reflections reported above from our own case study are not unique. 
As EBP has gained in stature, so have critical reflections. Three particular problems for 
context-sensitive processes are clear.  
Restricted definition of ‘evidence’ 
In a paper compellingly titled ‘What is the evidence that there is no evidence?’, Hakan 
Seckinelgin (2010) provides a detailed critique of the conclusion of ‘no evidence’ 
reached by a systematic review of evidence on the relation between conflict and 
HIV/AIDS. Seckinelgin questions the types of data which are deemed to comprise 
evidence, namely quantitatively sophisticated studies designed to eliminate ‘bias’.  
Unsurprisingly, there are limited numbers of such studies, and implementing a ‘strict’ 
definition of evidence discounts the vast majority of informative studies and theories 
that can contribute to building sound conclusions, but are not admissible, under the EBP 
regime, as ‘evidence’.   The general argument is that the definition of ‘evidence’ here 
fails to meet the needs of evidence users, compelling them to make less informed 
decisions than they might otherwise do.  
Ignoring context and complexity 
Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) book ‘Realistic Evaluation’ remains a classic on the topic of 
context. They note that the conclusion of most efforts to summarise or review the 
evidence on social interventions is that the research is ‘inconclusive’, with often a 
mixed bag of results, some positive, some negative, some indicating no effect. Pawson 
and Tilley’s main argument is that, rather than seeking blunt statements about whether 
an intervention works or not, researchers ought to be conceptualising the conditions 
under which a particular mechanism is more or less likely to work. An intervention 
might work in the presence of certain supportive conditions, but not without them. It 
might work for people with certain characteristics but not others.  Kippax (2012) argues 
that herein lies the flaw in applying the methods privileged by EBP to the evaluation of 
social interventions. She points out the distinction between efficacy (does a treatment 
work under ideal conditions, all things being equal?), and effectiveness (does a 
treatment work in the real world?). HIV medicines work well under ideal conditions, 
but in the absence of sufficient food, they do not (Seckinelgin 2012). As Mallett et al. 
(2012, 452) argue: ‘”cutting out the noise” risks missing the point in international 
development research (and the social sciences more broadly), where context is the 
primary consideration’. 
Academic authors writing about evidence and systematic reviews typically 
employ important caveats, including: the importance of exercising caution in 
generalising across contexts, the need to draw on local expertise to interpret evidence in 
relation to a particular policy context, the inconclusiveness of much of the research 
literature, the value of a range of forms of evidence, or that evidence should be seen as a 
contributor (among other sources) to EBP, rather than being considered the sole pillar of 
EBP (e.g. White and Waddington 2012; Shepperd et al. 2009). However, one of the 
main rationales given for systematic reviews in the context of policy-making is 
precisely to deal with ‘information overload’ (Petticrew and Roberts 2006, 22) or the 
‘bewildering amount of primary studies’ (DfID Research and Evidence Division 2010, 
2). 
MacLure (2005), based on her review of 30 systematic reviews, comments on 
the pressures on systematic review authors to offer recommendations, even if the 
findings are inconclusive. She observed that authors often acknowledged the lack of a 
secure evidentiary base, stated that it is not possible to draw implications confidently, 
and yet, in every review, they went on to put forward findings, recommendations and/or 
implications. In reporting our own review, we felt it would make an unsatisfying read to 
conclude that the findings were inconclusive. Indeed a peer-reviewer explicitly 
recommended that we include useful ‘lessons learned’ for practice. Accordingly, we 
concluded that community mobilisation is more likely to succeed with meaningful 
identity groups than with abstract ‘population’ groups. This interpretation can be 
supported by the review, but of course it also depends on a theory of community (as 
mutual identification), and goes beyond the data presented in the review. While an 
academic audience might tolerate a conclusion that no firm conclusion can be drawn, to 
be a useful policy tool, a systematic review needs to offer endorsement of one course of 
action or another. This is one source of the simplification and erasure of nuance that 
happens when variable scientific knowledge is subjected to systematic review.    
Aspiration to objectivity / Denial of reflexivity 
The EBP movement was premised on the value of striving for objectivity (rather than 
the subjective preferences of doctors, or the political leanings of politicians). 
Eliminating ‘bias’ on the part of the reviewer (along with replicability and rigour) is one 
of the three main planks in the argument for systematic reviews (e.g. DFID Research 
and Evidence Division 2010; Petticrew and Roberts 2006; White and Waddington 
2012). Counter to this ambition, it has been argued that critical specialist expertise is 
required for a meaningful systematic review (MacLure 2005). When the ‘treatment’ 
being evaluated is fuzzy or complex, the need for judgment becomes all the more acute. 
In conducting our systematic review, we knew we wanted to define community 
mobilisation to exclude the most instrumental operationalisations, as far as possible. 
This impetus came from our own experiences as researchers in the field, having 
observed practices labelled as ‘community mobilisation’ which did not fit with our own 
understandings of that term. Hence, we were suspicious of articles reporting community 
mobilisation being used simply, for example, to recruit men for circumcision. Articles 
reporting findings of quantitative studies often presented only very sketchy accounts of 
their community mobilisation activities. Where possible, we combed qualitative 
accounts of the trials. Inevitably, we had to use our judgement to decide whether 
‘community meetings’, ‘community theatre’, or ‘consultations’ should be classified as 
‘community mobilisation’ or not. Indeed, we had long discussions about what we meant 
by ‘real’ community mobilisation, and how to write in to our inclusion and exclusion 
criteria the human agency and empowerment that we considered to distinguish 
‘community mobilisation’ from instrumental peer education. 
Systematic review guidelines implicitly acknowledge the need for expert 
judgement, recommending that in the process of identifying potential articles for 
review, as well as searching databases, it is appropriate to contact researchers in the 
field to aid identification of relevant studies (Petticrew and Roberts 2006; Gough et al. 
2012). We followed this advice, and included the important IMAGE study (Pronyk et 
al. 2006), after consultation with colleagues, even though it did not use our designated 
key-words in its title or abstract. One of the peer-reviewers of our submitted article 
suggested a further study that ought to be included. Widening our search in this way 
enabled us to cover a greater literature, but also indicates the contingency involved in 
the inclusion of articles. Moreover, we drew on our ethnographic experiences and 
networks, as scientists and practitioners, in the worlds of both intervention 
implementation and social science. We knew that the Sonagachi project was famed as a 
‘successful’ community mobilisation project, but that it was also controversial. And, in 
particular, we were attuned to the over-use of the term ‘community mobilisation’, 
having encountered community mobilisation in action, rhetorical claims about the use 
of community mobilisation, and dissatisfaction among NGO workers we had spoken to 
in India, who complained about their NGOs misrepresenting their instrumental top-
down work as the more politically desirable ‘community mobilisation’. 
Here we encounter again a familiar complexity of the social sciences over the 
natural sciences, namely the reflexivity of human categories, or in other words, the fact 
that scientific terms are part and parcel of everyday life and everyday politics, and 
cannot be treated as insulated from those realms. ‘Community mobilisation’ is not a 
term with an objective referent. Moreover, it is a term that has rhetorical value (e.g. 
claiming that this intervention was ethically sound, or adhered to contemporary best 
practice). Given this, it is foreseeable that the term will be over-applied. Projects 
survive by claiming to implement best practice and by claiming success (Mosse 2005; 
Cornish and Ghosh 2007).  Decontextualising the label ‘community mobilisation’ (by 
taking authors’ claims to community mobilisation at face value) fails to acknowledge 
that ‘community mobilisation’ is a construction; the deployment of the term is often 
strategic, a rhetorical move rather than a representation of reality (see also Greenhalgh 
and Russell 2006). This suggests that it is not at all clear what exactly is being 
summarised and reviewed, when one reviews literature claiming to implement 
‘community mobilisation’.   
Together, these three problems deeply undermine the capacity of general 
statements about ‘the evidence’ for ‘community mobilisation’ to be meaningful. A 
statement such as ‘there is a tendency for positive impact of community mobilisation’ 
can be grammatically correct and methodologically justified, based on a rigorous and 
replicable systematic review method. But the term ‘community mobilisation’ does not 
refer to a single and stable entity. It is implemented differently in different 
interventions, is used to achieve different goals depending on situational demands, and 
may work through different mechanisms in different contexts.  For statements about 
context-sensitive processes such as community mobilisation to be meaningful, they 
have to be unpacked back into particular concrete settings and practices. Some people 
are mobilising, using certain participatory practices, to achieve particular goals. While 
such an argument for the specific and concrete seems at odds with the implicit 
universalising philosophy of science behind systematic reviews, it is not an anti-
scientific argument, as the following section elaborates. 
An alternative philosophy of evidence: Pragmatism 
This section turns to elaborating a perspective on evidence based in a pragmatist 
philosophy of science. What is notable about this philosophy is that, despite 
pragmatism’s test of truth, just like the EBP movement, being motivated by the question 
of ‘what works’, its conceptualisation of science is almost diametrically opposed to that 
implied in EBP. Specifically, the aspiration of EBP to objectivist, generalisable truths is 
opposed by a pragmatist version of science as an art of experience-based, context-
specific, gradual improvement.  To elaborate this perspective, the section explores four 
important principles of a pragmatist theorisation of science: the primacy of practice; the 
tool metaphor of knowledge; the focus on particulars over universals, and the 
experimentalist ethos of bringing about social change. 
Primacy of practice 
The defining characteristic of pragmatism is its privileging of practice as the bedrock 
and testing-ground of knowledge (Brinkmann 2013). Pragmatists argue that we have no 
grounds, and little to gain by trusting either in the realist aspiration for our concepts to 
match an unobservable reality, or the idealist advancement of the power of reflective 
thought to reach a purer truth than the messy truths of practical activity (Rorty 1999; 
Cornish and Gillespie 2009). Practice is empirical, experiential, contextual and 
historical. Being empirical, practice is what people do in a messy world. Here, the 
empirical has priority over abstract, universalised theorising. Pragmatists argue that we 
have no cause to doubt the reality of practice, in the way that we can doubt the reality of 
abstracted claims. Being experiential, practice links human subjectivity to worldly 
objects. Knowledge has to be in the meeting of human interests and worldly materials; it 
is not objective or cleansed of human interests or values. Being contextual and 
historical, practice is a response to the multiple demands of a particular place (it cannot 
be universal), and evolves over time, responding to what has gone before, and bringing 
about what comes next (it is not knowledge separate from the world, but it is world-
constituting practical knowledge).    
The primacy of practice has had a resurgence in the recent ‘practice turn’ in 
social sciences (Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and von Savigny 2001). Practice theorists 
privilege the local, particular and messy, over the presumption to sketch grand 
universalising theories (e.g. de Certeau 1984). In the context of theorising community 
health action, Nolas (2014), drawing on Deleuze and Guattari (1984), describes the 
practice turn as prioritising ‘journeys’ over ‘maps’. Maps represent idealised, abstracted 
intentions. In the context of interventions, maps typically represent a deterministic 
theory, of how to bring about personal or community change. Journeys, by contrast, are 
thick, contentful, peopled stories, reporting the messy, troubling, relational and 
contingent hard graft of working to produce personal or community change. Practice 
theorists do not deny the contingencies, unpredictabilities, and context-specificities of 
practice. Rather, they assume that the empirical world has this ‘messy’ character, and 
thus that the work of social science to understand, explain, or change must have its 
foundations firmly rooted in skilled working with ‘mess’ rather than in aspirations to 
decontextualized universalising principles. As the following sections elaborate, 
prioritising practice over grand theory has implications for the understanding of 
knowledge, evidence, science, and intentional change. 
Truths made, not found 
The key pragmatist intervention in epistemological debates has been to change the 
question that we ask about knowledge, from the commonsense and realist question of 
‘Does this knowledge accurately reflect the underlying reality?’ to the pragmatist 
question of ‘Does this knowledge serve our purposes?’ (Rorty  1999). Introducing the 
criterion of ‘serving our purposes’ puts interests (purposes) at the heart of 
determinations of truth. It also prioritises ‘what works’ as a criterion of ‘truth’ (rather 
than reference to an ultimate reality or an encompassing, coherent theory), echoing the 
EBP catchphrase. But it is even more radical. On questions of validity, Rorty counsels 
us to: ‘stop worrying about whether what one believes is well grounded and start 
worrying about whether one has been imaginative enough to think up interesting 
alternatives to one’s present beliefs’ (Rorty 1999). Rorty argues that humans are 
engaged in producing their own futures, and that we should give greater attention to 
imagining and pursuing the future we would prefer, rather than trying to ‘discover’ 
truths about the present. He considers literature as the pinnacle of human crafts, for its 
capacity to envision alternative futures. Such an argument would problematize the 
hierarchies of knowledge espoused by the EBP movement, and value theorising, 
critique, prefigurative politics, illuminative case studies, and any other methods that 
provoke novel and liberating figurations. 
Understanding truths as made in practice has a further critical consequence for 
discussions of ‘evidence’. Human practice is intelligent, reflective and productive. It 
does not simply reflect reality but makes reality. From this perspective, community 
mobilisation is not an inert object whose effectiveness can be measured. Successes and 
failures are made in practice, as a result of the intersection of people, activities, 
resources and constraints. To some extent, community mobilisation can be made to 
work. Its success partly depends on the degree to which we value community 
mobilisation enough to invest enough resources in it and commitment to it. 
Particulars, universals and judgements in context 
From a pragmatist, and practice-theoretical point of view, the  tools for action are not 
theories with universal claims, but expertise grounded in experience (Flyvbjerg 2001). 
In his book ‘Making Social Science Matter’, Flyvbjerg seeks to revive the status of 
‘phronesis’ or practical wisdom, as a valued accomplishment of social science.  Because 
human action is so context-dependent, and thereby not deterministic, Flyvbjerg argues 
that a good social scientist becomes an expert in their field – just as surgeons or football 
players become experts – through practical engagement in multiple, varying instances 
of their phenomenon in its natural context. Whereas the claims of social science to 
generality have been argued on the basis of universalising abstract theory, or on the 
basis of generalising from a sample to a population, Flyvbjerg’s argument is that it is 
through expert judgement in context that experience from one setting is made relevant 
and applicable to a new setting. Relatedly, in a study assessing evidence in an 
educational setting, Greenhalgh et al. (2003) argue that qualitative studies of student 
and staff experience played a crucial role in determining the validity and transferability 
of existing evidence. 
‘Mess’ and contingency do not imply unknowable, unpredictable, or paralysing 
chaos. But they do imply complexity, and interdependence of phenomena and their 
context. Dewey (1925) argues that science is an art, where art is understood as speaking 
both to the contingencies and to the regularities of reality. The art of social science 
consists in the scientist’s expertise in diagnosing, analysing, understanding and 
improving a particular local problem, in the light of past experience. According to 
Dewey (1925), what is needed is ‘discriminating judgement by methods whose 
consequences improve the art’ (p.383).  The word ‘judgement’ signifies a skilled human 
observer, who weighs the evidence, and comes to a judgement about the case, and what 
is likely to work. A judgement is not a statement of fact, but a considered outcome of 
weighing indeterminate evidence, building on past experience. A judgement is made 
about a specific case, and reflects its context. 
In the context of EBP, valuing expert judgement in this way returns to us the 
risk, which EBP claimed to counter at the outset, of an over-reliance on the peculiarities 
of individual clinicians. One response to this risk might be to maintain the use of 
judgement but to make it more accountable, by being more social, as I shall suggest, 
below. 
Change through gradual experimentalism 
The final principle I wish to address is that of experimentalism as the process of social 
and political change. Dewey concerned himself with the question of how 
transformational social change could come about without the violence and disruption of 
revolution. He sought out ways that democracy could bring about transformed societies, 
but incrementally and organically. Roberto Unger (2007) has taken up this project more 
recently, arguing that contemporary societies should concern themselves with creating 
organisational systems that allow for continual reinvention. He writes:  
our societies and cultures may be so arranged as to facilitate and to organize 
their own piecemeal, experimental revision. We then shorten the distance 
between routine moves within a framework and exceptional moves about the 
framework; we experience the latter as a direct and frequent extension of the 
former. As a result, we denaturalise society and culture: we unfreeze them 
(Unger 2007, 7). 
This is another argument in favour of local, incremental adaptation, in response to 
context, as opposed to the ambition of EBP to identify an intervention that ‘works’ 
which can then be ‘scaled up’ and ‘rolled out’.  
The vision of how we organise our societies to try to improve them, espoused 
here, is to enable local, organic and piecemeal change.  Two important implications for 
the policy-making process follow. The first is an argument that we should focus on 
creating good processes for collective decision-making and collection action, rather than 
focusing on achieving a pre-determined outcome (Brinkmann 2013). The second is a 
consideration of interventions and their outcomes as part of a cycle of ongoing 
invention. In this cycle, much trial-and-error learning takes place. ‘Failure’ is part of the 
learning process, and informs improvements. ‘Failed’ interventions may not be failures 
at all, but part of a learning cycle, creating knowledge to be put to use in the next 
experiment in the cycle. 
Towards pragmatist versions of ‘evidence’ 
What might ‘evidence’ look like in a policy-making process designed by a pragmatist? 
Pragmatism does not indicate that ‘anything goes’, or that contingency and localism 
imply that there is nothing more than trial and error learning to be done. I make three 
preliminary suggestions for directions which a pragmatist version of ‘evidence’ might 
imply.  
Firstly, the approach which I have outlined calls for a broadening of the 
understanding of ‘evidence’ beyond the prioritisation of systematic review and RCT. 
Local case studies of intervention processes in context, theorisations of practice, 
experimentation with novel intervention processes, perspectives of local people – these 
are all sources of information which do not contribute to EBP as currently defined, but 
which build valued intellectual resources for informing action. In most areas of social 
action, our knowledge does not allow accurate prediction. Rather than excluding 
potentially informative studies because they do not fit the highly restrictive 
methodological criteria traditionally applied in systematic reviews (MacLure 2005), a 
good pragmatist use of evidence would make use of the variety of research available. 
Given the exponential expansion of the research literature over the last several decades, 
can it really be true that a systematic review in any area can either meaningfully be 
based on less than ten studies as is common (MacLure 2005), or that ‘more research is 
needed’ (Billig 2013; Greenhalgh 2012 ‘Less research is needed’ 
http://blogs.plos.org/speakingofmedicine/2012/06/25/less-research-is-needed/ )?   
Secondly, evidence synthesis is possible, but different, from a pragmatist point 
of view. The process of weighing this evidence, if we accept the arguments of Dewey 
and Flyvbjerg in favour of expert human judgement, would place greater reliance on 
skilled consideration of evidence, assessed with reference to experience in context. The 
‘diagnostic approach’ to intervention design is one example of such a process (Gupta et 
al. 2008; Mannell, Cornish & Russell, 2014; Parkhurst 2013). Following this approach, 
rather than assuming that evidence is easily transferred across contexts, the task of 
intervention design is to critically and sensitively assess which causal mechanisms are 
most important in a given context.  An analogy to the use of evidence in a court, in 
which experienced judges weigh a variety of sources of information, might also be a 
helpful model. Making this process social, and particularly, involving diverse voices in 
this new court (including representatives of local communities; clinicians; scientists; 
economists; civil servants; etc) is one way to counter the risks attached to claims of 
expert judgement: that they may reflect personal whim or political agenda.  
Thirdly, regarding the kinds of initiatives to be supported by policy, the 
pragmatist approach suggests focusing on processes rather than pre-determined 
outcomes. Policy might support local experimentation by reducing the emphasis on 
reaching pre-determined, national-level objectives. It might initiate processes for the 
improvement of practice, rather than prescribing specific practices. In the field of 
‘improvement science’ for instance, Aveling et al. (2012) report on ‘clinical 
communities’ as a means of enabling clinicians to work collectively to improve their 
practices. The focus is on the means of working together to change practices, rather than 
on specific outcomes.  
Conclusion: Evidence in context  
This article has problematised the idea that it is possible to make a summary statement 
of whether an intervention ‘works’ or not, by means of a systematic review. It has 
argued against making universalising statements about ‘what works’ by arguing for the 
importance of local context and local judgement to answer the more relevant question of 
‘what works for this particular time, place, and these goals’. Overall, the article has 
argued that evidence is not abstract, disinterested or disembodied. To be ‘evidence’, 
knowledge has to be used by an evidence user. Understandings of ‘evidence’ are 
themselves located, embodied in particular persons with particular histories, interests 
and social locations. What is deemed ‘evidence’ in different contexts is consonant with 
the human practices of different social roles. Administrators are required to made 
decisions about the allocation of resources. They are increasingly called to account for 
their decisions in a transparent manner. Reference to systematic reviews of ‘the 
evidence’ supports the goals of displaying fairness and transparency (Cornish and 
Gillespie 2009). In contrast, NGO workers and communities may seek to understand 
local practices and create interventions that are plausible, feasible, and empowering 
locally. In this context, reference to decontextualized ‘evidence’ provides little more 
than a suggestion as to what has happened elsewhere, which might be made relevant to 
local needs, and which might (or might not) feasibly mobilise sufficient interest and 
commitment to make it worth implementing. Research scholars might contribute to 
either of these sets of interests, or to other interests in advancing understandings of the 
policy-practice knowledge system as a whole, or to advance theory or critique. Social 
science need not prioritise abstract universalising statements. While such statements 
may be the concern international donors and policy-makers, scientific research can be 
more nuanced (Behague et al. 2009). A pragmatist science of evidence would begin 
with the ‘mess’ of practice and seek to understand complexity and contingency rather 
than efface it. For those who work with people and communities, in the complexity of 
practice, the aspiration to produce simple summaries of evidence appears puzzling. 
From a perspective rooted in local realities, aspirations to draw on a diversity of forms 
of knowledge; to draw on practical wisdom to design interventions suited to contexts; 
and to develop models for making good context-sensitive judgements appear more 
fitting priorities.   
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